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THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

DELIVERED ON THE THIRTIETH OF DECEMBER, 1902, AT THE
TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION,
HELD AT THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.
BY JAMES WILSON BRIGHT.

CONCERNING THE UNWRITTEN HISTORY OF THE
MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA.

This is the twentieth annual meeting of our Association, and it has been thought of as a suitable event for marking off a first period of our history. A score of years is a sufficiently conventional unit of measure to assure the form and the significance of a celebration of that character, and the nearness to the hyphen of the centuries would also lend appropriateness to our first comprehensive retrospection. But these thoughts have not been 'submitted' regularly to the Association; they have, on the contrary, not spread much beyond the few individual minds of their spontaneous and coincident birth, and therefore no authorized historic sketch has been prepared, no tablet has been inscribed, no bronze is to be unveiled.

These special circumstances of this meeting, however, it must be acknowledged, have been regarded as indications of a subject suitable for the present address. At least the word 'history' in the title would thus be accounted for; and whatever hope of protection may be fixed in the apologetic 'concerning,' it is by an acquired instinct that we feel it to be *locum tenens* in our professional literature, a titular lieutenant that could not be spared lest our mental processes might become dissociated for one fatal moment from the German *über*. But it is especially necessary to issue a warning against a possible misapprehension of 'history' as here qualified. By 'unwritten history' shall be meant the direct and complete contrast to mere history. This should be kept in mind.

It follows, therefore, that whereas history in the usual sense is an orderly composition, with complexity of details brought under the law of unity of design, a trustworthy account of all events in chronological sequence, interpreted by an impartial judgment and by unbiassed feeling, 'unwritten history' is acquitted of any adherence whatsoever to this canon of virtues.

For what is here meant an approximate definition would be given in the Greek *ἀνέκδοτα*, 'unpublished things'; but somewhat more specifically the aim of reference is levelled at such experiences as those which the historian often misunderstands or overlooks altogether.

But whose experiences? As there can be no common experience which is not made up of individual experiences, there will be no misunderstanding if it be replied, The experiences of the Association. And as the following rambling recital of some of these experiences proceeds, it is, consequently, the privilege of each one enrolled on the list of members,—not excluding any one whose name, in the wisdom of the treasurer has, early or late, been cancelled from that list,—to make direct appropriation of as many of the more congenial experiences as he may feel constrained to assume, and to refer the more grievous ones to the comprehensive and impersonal personality of the Association. We shall thus be aided in flattering all and in offending none.

There can be no arraignment of organization, cries the public orator, and the people respond, Let there be organization in politics, in finance, in industries, in trade, in science, in education, in religion, in charity. The orator rejoins, There are countless activities of mind and muscle, and all-pervading feelings and impulses of the human heart, but greater than these is organization. In the circumstances there was nothing to do but to organize; and at the risk, therefore, of incurring the charge of trespassing upon the privileges of the normal historian, by beginning at the beginning, we shall find in the conditions that led to the formation of this Association concerns and by-concernments of our 'unwritten history.'

In retrospect it may now begin to excite surprise in some minds to be told that certain conditions that might have been conjectured as necessary incitements to our first corporate acts were never experienced. All prophecy of our beginnings would surely have contained a certain element of error, for the veracious historian will have to record no *Histoire de la querelle des anciens et des modernes*.

Two hundred years ago (1704), the master satirist of the most satirical period of our literature published *An Account of a Battle between the Ancient and Modern Books in St. James's Library*. The misanthropic Dean was intensely convinced of human folly and always wrote with a cynical determination to bring about, as he expressed it, "the universal improvement of mankind." This was his avowed purpose in taking up that Gallic War which his great patron had transferred to England.

That was a remarkable war. It originated in the purpose of an encomium on the reign of the Grand Monarch; and the panegyric genius of a Claudian might have convinced that age of talent without genius, that age of practical education without profound learning, that age of organization, that the spontaneous play of the clear and bubbling Helicon and the secret windings of the sweet waters of Arethusa were surpassed by the *Grandes Eaux* of the spigots and stop-cocks of Versailles. That was a remarkable war in which, while sharply defining party-names were borne by the opposing forces, the Commander-in-chief of the 'ancients' fought and won his battle in the ranks of the 'moderns.' That was a remarkable war, that war 'about the higher summity of Parnassus,' in which hot disputes over subordinate details delayed the acknowledgment that upon the main question at issue there could be no ground for differences or hostility of belief.

The end achieved by the *Battle of the Books* was never formally defined. We have grown wiser now and are always ready with our philosophical mutterings. For the resolution of antagonism between Science and Religion, we recommend

more science on the one side, and on the other more religion ; we urge upon Science to become more scientific, and upon Religion to become more religious. If perchance the aim be higher, we say, Let Science become fittingly religious, and let Religion become honestly scientific, and there's the end of the matter. And so we summarize with the 'ancients' and the 'moderns,' asking the 'ancients' to project themselves into the modern world by the logic of inevitable sequence, and the 'moderns,' in reversed order, to be equally sound in historic knowledge, and obedient to historic truth. The 'ancients' we demand, must be modernized into life, and the 'moderns' must be seasoned and disciplined into the dignities of tradition.

But we must revert to that quarrel of the 'ancients' and the 'moderns' to observe that it was remarkable above all for its untimeliness. It was before its time ; and when its time had come, generations later, the solution of the problem was effected by the noiseless and inevitable operation of the great law of progress. When the quarrel was still premature, the minds of men were fascinated by the paradox *antiquitas saeculi iuventus mundi*, according to which, modern times, in strictness of chronology, constitute antiquity, the 'moderns' being the real 'ancients' ; but when, in the fulness of time, the great and beneficent law of the wider vision began to set in, the paradox of the myopic partisan was gradually understood to be the plainest statement of a profound truth. Notions of the successions of times now took the place of notions of the oppositions of times. The minds of men were now fascinated by the observation of the continuity of history and culture. Succession, transmission, growth, evolution, these were the notions that set at naught the folly of that untimely and forever unnecessary quarrel.

The initiative conditions of our organization were therefore conditions not of warfare but of peace, of peace, however, as strenuous as war itself,—but what device of expression has not too often been pressed into the service of describing the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century ! Those were days not of educational warfare, but rather of educational awakening and

questioning and experimentation,—a time of facility in readjustments, in changes of attitude, in revisions of creed. Nor were these chiefly superficial disturbances of the social equanimity; they were the manifestation of a fruition of the times. There were indeed experiences akin to those of a thorough-going reformation, but the main current of events moved on peaceably, noiselessly, and irresistibly.

But there was some noise, it may be objected, and there was strife to overcome stubborn resistance. At this point where the historian might be misled, the truth of the 'unwritten history' must be asserted.

The Phi Beta Kappa orator at Harvard University who had forgotten his Greek alphabet, and the President of Yale University whose knowledge of his vernacular led him to group Anglo-Saxon with Quaternions and to assign to both a place in the hot-house of intellectual exotics, these and all such antagonists were wholly unfitted to make an appeal in behalf of the vital question at issue. Certain educational ideas of greatest importance had indeed gained virility in the saddle of the cavalry officer, and others had become freighted with a commercial value that had accumulated in the office of the Railway Commissioner, and these ideas in their strength and value are still potent, though they have lost their revolutionary demeanor. Other educational ideas of the greatest importance had been kept alive in academic seclusion, and these too have strength and value and will have to the end of time. But let it be repeated that the purposes to be served in the founding of this Association were not involved in an assault upon the classical traditions of the college, in an indictment of a fetish-worship of the Greek language; nor were those purposes either helped or hindered by the comparative tests applied to the 'modernist'-education of the *Realschule* and the 'classicist'-education of the *Gymnasium*.

To understand the purposes of this Association we must dismiss from our minds all notions of a direct relationship with that variety of controversy that has just now been

recalled, though it must be perceived that there is here an indirect relationship that may be easily misunderstood to be direct. It may perhaps have been unwise even thus by elimination to bring suggestions of controversy within the range of our present reflections upon the aims of this Association.

We are now in direct contact with our subject, for it is the countless individual modes of apprehending and of misapprehending the aims of this Association that constitute that 'unwritten history' with which we have to do. But why such diversity in interpretations and misinterpretations? The reply is paradoxical, Because the subject is simple. It is characteristic of educational principles to be simple, and it is equally characteristic of the educational theorist to pervert the effectively simple into aimless and unprofitable complexity.

The third section of the Constitution states the complete purpose for which this Association was organized: "The object of this Association shall be the advancement of the study of the Modern Languages and Literatures." That is brief and to the point, if you please; or, if you prefer, it is comprehensive and points everywhere,—St. Augustine himself could not have wished it more capable of all possible interpretations. A possible division emerges here between the 'point' and the 'points,' and the constructionists might accordingly be grouped, with some show of fitness, into the point-party and the points-party, with a residuum left for the pointless party.

A moment's reflection upon this constitution of less than twenty words,—for the article cited is of course in essence the entire constitution,—a moment's reflection, then, upon this written constitution is sufficient to show that the Association has been guided almost entirely by an unwritten constitution. Our present subject would thus seem to require restatement in ampler form; we seem to be committed to consider things relating to the 'unwritten history' of an organization with an unwritten constitution. This extension of our subject, as has already been shown by an anticipatory inference, has more

than the mere appearance of homogeneity ; for the facts of 'unwritten history,' in our special sense, must in many instances be directly referred to conditions made possible by the interpretations of an unwritten constitution.

Among the constructionists—rather the misconstructionists—who saw possibilities of activity in the early conventions of this Association were the foreign fencing-master and dancing-master with the superadded 'arts' of the 'tongues,'—the 'tongues' as accomplishments to be classed with fencing and dancing,—the curling-tongs, as Sir Toby Belch would have it, to 'mend,' to curl our locks which like those of Sir Andrew Aguecheek, we were told, hung "like flax on a distaff." It is gratifying to know that this Association did not yield to the allurements of becoming a Gild of Barbers. It seemed necessary, it was necessary, to assume an indifference to the uses of the curling-tongs.

Other attendants of those early meetings when the Association, now grown so large in all its dimensions, was then yet like Falstaff in his early years "not an eagle's talon in the waist,"—it "could have crept into any alderman's thumb-ring,"—other participants in those early, tentative deliberations were concerned in founding or in finding here a Teachers' Agency. It was remembered, seemingly, that among the Bibles of typographical rarity there was to be found the 'Place-Makers Bible,' in which the beatitude of Matthew v, 9 reads, "Blessed are the place-makers;" but notwithstanding this extraordinary testimony and endorsement, the Association, we rejoice to say, has not yet become a Teachers' Agency.

And there were present in those early days a known class of advocates of 'methods of teachings.' Now there must be methods for imparting knowledge; but these over-zealous teachers seemed to expostulate thus, Notice the divisions of the subject, method and knowledge; two things; both important; but, if one can't have both, one should have at least method. History and experience, they seemed to add, attest the value of methods of teaching. Observe Seneca for example; does he

not impose an inference? the philosopher of morals, was he not the teacher of Nero? a teacher lacking in method? It was however not believed to be the business of the Association to give serious attention to this cause; on the contrary, the temperament of these systematicians was felt to be essentially incompatible with that of the scholar, and this conviction, in view of the cherished purpose of the organization, was happily sufficient to assure their gentle but unflinching suppression.

A knowledge of the modern languages is a help in the pursuit of the natural sciences. Not long ago there was something novel and surprising in the sensation excited by this statement, and it was natural that observers of a certain temperament should see in this Association an adjunct to the Scientific School, to the Polytechnic Institute. That was a substantial gain. It was real progress to pass from the girls' finishing school into the laboratories of the University; and that was sound reasoning that made manifest such a requirement in the equipment of the student of nature for the widest and best citizenship in the world of science. Indeed it must be admitted that all departments of knowledge profited by the idea of world-citizenship, which, in the mediating form of a 'practical' measure, as presented by the science-party, won so much of general approval as to make it available for other applications. And the Association stood in need of just this service when it was striving to make its own idea prevail. If the man of science, whose work in the general opinions and feelings is related to 'practical education,' if the 'practical man' could effect a persuasion that after all we must "trouble ourselves about foreign thought," for we can't "invent the whole thing for ourselves as we go along," then surely the way was in preparation for some acknowledgment of the true basis of sound progress in knowledge and culture, and for something of that "free play of the mind" on all subjects in accordance with the nature of each subject, upon which Matthew Arnold bases the structure of true criticism.

The times, therefore, abounded in helps and hindrances to the achievement of the best. The air was charged with a spirit of alertness; activity was stimulated, and there was insistent looking to results. The lets and hindrances were also principally such as are incident to overstimulation of activity, and to close-ranging valuation of results; for the achievement of the best is usually involved in unostentatious growth, and is, therefore, not "heedless of far gain" nor "greedy for quick returns of profit." And it was for the achievement of the best, let it be iterated, that the Association was striving and has hitherto been striving.

It were easy to find concise and technically adequate expression for the description of this best; but these technicalities are not easily resolved into terms that may be at once plain and adequate. For the general comprehension, let us say for the general reader, for example, it would be difficult to select such a 'course of reading on the subject' (the phrase has a familiar sound) as might suggest preparation of a paper for a literary club, or an examination in a 'University by Correspondence.' From those depressing annual lists of publications on education, from those books, journals, Records, Reports, Proceedings, monographs, addresses, articles (reprinted and misprinted), even the technical reader would be puzzled to collect much that might be available in setting forth in a clear manner the simple yet lofty purpose of this Association.

That purpose was philological, and a concise and technically adequate modification of that third section of the Constitution just cited would therefore be 'the advancement of the philological study of modern life and culture,' or this, 'the advancement of philology in the departments of the modern languages.' That word philological is, of course, at the bottom of all the trouble. But this is not the time to define philology; to do that one should be engaged in history of the most comprehensive and philosophical character, because comprehensively and philosophically philology embraces

history as a department of itself,—a relationship, it may be observed in passing, which has unhappily not affected experience to such a degree as to preclude the advent of the unphilological historian, with whom should be classed the unhistorical student of language and literature, the unhistorical philologist.

It has of course become necessary to divide the science of philology into at least two large departments, philology and history; and to comprehend the meaning and scope of philology under this division, has constituted the unrecorded struggle of many a member of this Association. For is it so very strange to be told that a scholar may not be alive to the complete significance of the science to which he may be devoting his life? He is truly a master that feels the deepest import and measures the widest reaches of his science; and we accordingly find the masters framing definitions in those outlines which their followers may endeavor to fill, each according to the measure of his capabilities, with the content of significant feeling and experience.

Although it would not be to our present purpose to turn directly to the great definitions of philology, yet we may be allowed to avail ourselves of analogy—that never-failing expedient—and turn to masters of modern history for an inferential characterization of modern philology, and possibly for an indirect explanation of some of our less exultant experiences in endeavoring to comprehend the character and range of our science, ‘to see it steadily and to see it whole.’

The *Introductory Lectures on Modern History* delivered sixty years ago (1841–42) in the University of Oxford by Dr. Thomas Arnold show clearly that modern history as well as modern philology has stood in need of sound definition. And that the time for definitions does not rapidly pass away, may be learned by comparing with the lectures of Arnold those of Stubbs delivered on the same foundation in the years 1867–1884. Both lecturers discuss the question, What constitutes modern history? and thus furnish help for

the consideration of the parallel and closely related inquiry, What constitutes modern philology?

The question in Dr. Arnold's words is "whether ancient and modern history in the popular sense of the words differ only in this, that one relates to events which took place before a certain period, and the other to events which have happened since that period; or whether there is a real distinction between them, grounded upon an essential difference in their nature. If they differ only chronologically, it is manifest that the line which separates them is purely arbitrary: and we might equally well fix the limit of ancient history at the fall of the Babylonian monarchy and embrace the whole fortunes of Greece and Rome within what we choose to call modern; or, on the other hand, we might carry on ancient history to the close of the fifteenth century, and place the beginning of modern history at that memorable period which witnessed the expulsion of the Moors from Spain, the discovery of America, and, only a few years later, the Reformation."

"It seems, however, that there is a real difference between ancient and modern history, which justifies the limit usually assigned to them; the fall, namely, of the western empire; that is to say, the fall of the western empire separates the subsequent period from that which preceded it by a broader line, so far as we are concerned, than can be found at any other point either earlier or later. For the state of things now in existence, dates its origin from the fall of the western empire; so far we can trace up the fortunes of nations which are still flourishing; history so far is the biography of the living; beyond, it is the biography of the dead."

Dr. Arnold's meaning is plain. The modern nations as such have their peculiar historical beginnings. There is a unity in English history, whether it is held to begin with the Angles and Saxons on the island (according to Dr. Arnold) or on the continent (according to Professor Freeman). In like manner an essential principle in historic doctrine is made manifest when Dr. Arnold says: "France and Frenchmen

came into being when the Franks established themselves west of the Rhine. Not that before that period the fathers of the majority of the actual French people were living on the Elbe or the Saal; for the Franks were numerically few, and throughout the south of France the population is predominantly, and much more than predominantly, of Gallo-Roman origin. But Clovis and his Germans struck root so deeply, and their institutions wrought such changes, that the identity of France cannot be carried back beyond their invasion: the older elements no doubt have helped greatly to characterize the existing nation; but they cannot be said by themselves to be that nation."

Dr. Arnold supplies a formula for the distinction between ancient and modern history. The history of a modern nation begins when its principal national elements of race, language, institutions, and religion first meet under conditions for organic combination. Individually and in other combinations these elements may have an antique history; but the new composition into which the old elements may enter marks the beginning of a new history. The subject of modern history thus becomes wide, and complex, and rich in content. In Dr. Arnold's words, "Modern history exhibits a fuller development of the human race, a richer combination of its most remarkable elements." We are not intent upon the enthusiastic comparatives here employed,—the grammarian is familiar with a weakening effect of the comparative,—but we are intent upon the plain truth that dignifies modern history into a profoundly great and worthy science.

The philologist has his corresponding formula for the distinction of the modern periods. Latin grammar and Romance grammar are separated not chronologically merely but significantly by a difference which requires the hypothesis of a new beginning. Primitive Germanic grammar must be theoretically reconstructed in accordance with Indo-European linguistic antiquity on the one side, and on the other in accordance with the new life of the historic Germanic tongues.

The galaxy of 'starred forms' shoots terror into the dismayed breast of the incipient grammarian, but he that survives with the spirit to conjecture, predict, and verify phenomena, to photograph invisible clusters with motions in obedience to Verner's Law, he has begun to apprehend the priesthood of science.

In every department of literature the formula of modernity mediates between the medieval and modern periods and that of antiquity. Mere chronology fails as surely to carry us from Vergil to Dante as it fails to carry us from Plutarch to Montaigne, from Martial to Herrick, from Lucian to Landor, or from Theocritus to Tennyson. The modern drama has its formula of a distinctly new beginning, and a history that is unrivalled in human interest. What is the formula of the *Völsunga*, of the *Muspilli*, and of the *Beowulf*? The "Western hypothesis" challenges the profoundest knowledge of classical antiquity and the exercise of the scientific imagination in the reconstruction of the processes by which cosmographical, mythological, and ethical elements may be transmitted and transformed into new systems. What expression have we for the relation between the Orient and the Occident in fable and story? How do we pass from the *Panchatantra* to the *Decameron*? from Æsop, who has himself become a myth, to Marie de France, who has almost become one? The formula of modernity must also comprise literary art, and the systems of criticism; and it must be enlarged to include the systems of philosophical thought. In its most comprehensive reaches the formula of modernity for both history and philology must represent the blending of the great systems of civilization; the Germanic, the Slavonic, the Celtic, the Greek, the Semitic, and the Latin, these systems in different combinations constitute the fundamental elements of the great European nationalities. From the point of view that might be gained from the just consideration of the formula of modernity, is not modern philology also a profoundly great and worthy science?

Modern philology is therefore significantly marked off from classical philology ; each has its peculiar historic domain, and each has its peculiar set of phenomena, in the manner, however, of departments of one comprehensive science. The schoolmaster in the *Heart of Midlothian* would of course contemptuously refuse to coördinate in dignities the philology of the ‘learned languages’ and that of the ‘modern Babylonian jargons ;’ and some of his descendants have hardly been dissuaded from adherence to a theory of dimorphism in philology, according to which the ‘classical’ conditions of crystallization produce diamonds, while the pressure and temperature of the modern periods bring the same substance merely to the state of coal or of graphite.

The ‘coördination in dignities’ of these departments of philology,—does that phrase suggest chapter upon chapter of our ‘unwritten history?’ Aubrey De Vere once described the tories as persons who would “*uninvent* printing and *un*-discover America.” Have we had experiences, individually and as a society, with academic toryism that would fain have *undiscovered* Sanskrit, and *uninvented* the Indo-European Parent Speech? The disappearance of that toryism—for it has disappeared—marks a universal change in the academic attitude of mind toward philology in all its departments. The modern philologist has had a struggle, and he has won ; the classical philologist has also won, for the cause has been a common cause,—an appeal to the disinterested valuation of the study of life and culture. Philological Congresses now celebrate an achievement which not long ago seemed far in the future,—the advent of an era of academic toleration in matters philological. All departments of philology are now viewed educationally and ‘officially’ through the same colorless medium, and allowed to group themselves in accordance with the law of their affinities. Nothing could be more satisfactory ; and in the circumstances we can have no bitter quarrel with the past. Some suggested recollections of experiences

may, however, help one to realize past problems, and reveal principles for future guidance.

The science of Indo-European philology in establishing the sisterhood of the languages and systems of culture established at once both its inherent unity as a comprehensive science and its inherent division into a sisterhood of philologies. It was the birth of new sciences and the rebirth of old sciences, and a discovery of their interrelations. The traditions of the schools had accordingly to undergo readjustments and to admit innovations.

The schools were affected, even the secondary schools, by such readjustments. For example, the youth of the land was allured by a revision of the Latin and Greek paradigms 'incorporating the latest results in Comparative Grammar so far as they may be of use to the beginner,' so the declaration ran, 'and so far as they may lead to more scientific academic training.' These phrases were most in vogue before America could be said to have contributed much to this high-sounding Comparative Grammar. But a judicious ostentation of scanty knowledge may at times be impressive and even stimulating; and Englishmen and Americans cannot be said to find the art of it especially hard to acquire.

And what was to be done for English? Here one could not, so directly, at least, introduce the 'latest results of Comparative Grammar,' and yet complacency in the old manner was not possible in that newly invigorated atmosphere. Let us teach English as Greek and Latin are taught, imitating the manner as closely as possible, was the conclusion of such as resolve difficulties by cutting the knot. The study of English must be made 'hard' and 'disciplinary' they declared. And so it was made "hard" by the employment of the most foolish methods that ever brought ridicule upon any study.

The wisest observers saw in such revisions and experiments the natural consequences of conditions that were transitional. Indeed 'tentative' and 'transitional' became even generally

familiar as passwords that stopped all further challenge, however vigilant and stern the sentinel. Or, to change the figure, if it be allowed, a habitual frame of mind seemed to be superinduced—like that of the medieval anchorite—by the contemplation of the ‘transitory state’ and the vision of better things to come. Better things were to come, and they have come. The philologies we are having in mind particularly have survived in the most admirable manner a period of fundamental changes and of thoroughgoing tests.

The written history of these sciences during the last three or four decades will be ‘full of interest,’—as the parlance of the profession has it; but its most fascinating chapters will be occupied not so much with the independent career of each as with an interplay of influences between these philologies, an interchange of favors, and a readjustment of the ‘balance of power’ between them. The truest philological insight will be required to compose those chapters that may adequately make manifest what classical philology bequeathed to modern philology, and what modern philology gave in return. There will be a record of inheriting from the classical side the technicalities of systematization and the product of the wisdom of generations in grammar, rhetoric, palæography, archæology, the arts, and criticism. Modern philology will be rewarded for verification of technicalities and traditions by observation of vernacular phenomena. The science of phonetics and the study of living dialects will be described as bringing sheaves to the richly stored old garner. The hegemony of literary centers rising and falling in the midst of dialectal rivalry will be illustrated for Greek by modern European parallels; and the modern literatures will be acknowledged to give additional breath to the view that perceives that the canon of literary art-forms is not closed, that it probably never can be closed. But we shall not pursue further the list of necessary chapter-heads in that history. When one is concerned with ‘unwritten history’ every temptation to become coherent must be resisted.

But let us keep the note of rejoicing sounding upon our ears. Better things have come to pass, and they have come quickly. They have cost the price of founding new departments, and of reinvigorating old departments of ideal pursuits in a practical world where "alle things obeyen to moneye;" but we may rejoice that there has been an abundant and a willing expenditure of the required coinage of devotion of heart and personal sacrifice.

This Association has had such a goodly share in the experiences of founding new learning that it may be appropriate to illustrate the point. A short passage from Bishop Stubbs's "Inaugural Lecture" of that series already mentioned will serve the purpose. Referring to the Oxford of "sixteen years ago," he says:

"At that time the professorship of Church History had been founded, and was filled by one [Robert Hussey] who was undoubtedly the founder of the modern study of that subject in Oxford. I mean the study of the history of the Church as a whole, not from points of controversy to supply weapons for the discomfiture of opposing theologians, but as the life of the Christian Church itself. . . . But the theological exigencies of the time had so far narrowed the field of inquiry that it was practically restricted to the first three centuries, or at the outside to the period embraced under the topics of the general councils." And here are some of the hindrances: "The attempt which he made to extend the range by introducing the study of the Venerable Bede as a text-book was, as you are aware, foiled by the impossibility of getting together a lecture on a matter that was neither connected with the controversies of the day, nor required to be known by candidates for holy orders."¹

Parallels to this procedure could be pointed out in many departments of philology. The fetters of traditions that may

¹*Seventeen Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History and Kindred Subjects.* Oxford, 1886, p. 7 f.

bind a science hand and foot, and the outcry of utility and 'practical wisdom' against disinterested scholarship, experience has made these things altogether familiar. But let the concrete example be kept in mind for a moment longer. The difficulty was to establish the true study of the Christian Church, the Christian Church itself and for its own sake, in the place of the study of controversy for the sake of controversy. And the practical objection was that one could not require of the candidates for holy orders, and consequently of the priests of the English Church, a knowledge of the 'Ecclesiastical History of the English People.'

But better things have come to pass also in Oxford. 'The Merton Professorship of English Language and Literature' elicited a discussion that led to the acknowledgment of the extensive and varied character of the principal departments of English philology; in due time the Modern Language Tripos was set up; and, curiously, to return to our illustration, Bede's 'Ecclesiastical History of the English People' came to be studied in class "with a view to the Theological Final School."

The better things in which we rejoice to-day have, naturally, the marks of their time upon them. Professor Oertel states an important fact in the following admirable fashion: "The growth of a science is reflected in the chief tendencies of its important investigations; and these variations will, on closer inspection, never appear capricious. For, though it might seem that sciences of all intellectual manifestations are freest and most independent in their development, closer scrutiny will reveal the law that the new ideas which advance and transform them do not arise spontaneously or stand isolated; on the contrary, they will be found closely correlated to the general intellectual drift and philosophical attitude of a given period of history."¹

We are permitted, it is even enjoined upon us, therefore, to look as deeply as into the very depths of the principles by

¹ Hanns Oertel, *Lectures on the Study of Language*, New York, 1901, p. 4.

which civilization progresses, for the true vision of the coming of the *junggrammatiker*; and it would be folly, obviously, to deny what has been accomplished in that campaign of phonetic law and analogy against anomaly. It also has belonged strictly to the "scientific tendencies" of the time, to equip the laboratories of science with the materials required for direct observation and inductive study. It has been a time for the founding of Text Societies and of departmental Journals; it has been the most flourishing period of the scientific monograph known to history. A period of such strong characteristics will, of course, be followed by certain reactions; new balances will be restored, and new exaggerations will swing far away from the old extremes. But the transition from one period to another is never abrupt. We are still somewhat under the dominion of Paul and Braune's *Beiträge*, whatever we may say; the volumes of the *Romania* will continue to be numbered consecutively; and *Anglia*, *Englische Studien* and the *Archiv* may continue even into a future when they will be read, because of his interest in things "sacred to philology," by the contributor to the *Saturday Review*.¹ Synchronization and attunement, in the terms of wireless telegraphy, will secure the silent communication of decade with decade in the career of a vital science.

It has been a period of specialization in scholarship; there will be more specialization, much more, in the future. Professor Shaler² observes that organic life is possible at only one-half of the temperatures due to the earth's climatal conditions, and that the quantity of matter "at any one time in the vitalized state" is proportionately "insignificant," for "all the living forms of to-day," he says, "if brought down upon the surface of the earth . . . would form "a mere film" on the sphere—"an infinitesimal part of that mass which can never feel the vital impulse." The highest forms of

¹ Cf. *Saturday Review*, 23 Nov. 1901, p. 653.

² Nathaniel S. Shaler, *The Individual: a Study of Life and Death*. New York, 1901, p. 101.

knowledge will, we know, never be fostered within the whole domain of human interests ; true specialization will probably never represent more than a proportionately small part of the entire educational activity of human society at any one time. But the future of philology, just as the future of the highest forms all other sciences and departments of learning, will be in the hands of the specialist, who would not get much inspiration from President Hadley's decision that " the scientific specialist, so long as he remains a specialist, is something less than a whole man." ¹

The context, as would be conjectured, mitigates the abruptness of this decision. President Hadley warmly and eloquently enough extols the specialist's pursuit of truth for its " own sake," and sees in this pursuit one of the noblest purposes of the University ; but he would have us remember that we are first and last American citizens, and that, therefore, the most important thing is not specialization in knowledge, not scientific devotion to the promotion of truth for its own sake, not the inspired insistence on " non-commercial values," not the laying of the foundations of virtue in wisdom, in the accumulated wisdom of mankind, " but," he says, " the most profoundly important work which falls to the lot of the American citizen is his work of guiding the destinies of the country." Therefore, he adds, " important as it is to endow the research of those who are serving the public in non-remunerative lines, we cannot regard the scientific specialist as the consummate flower of American education." To this one may reply confidently, that to exalt an ephebic dilution of knowledges to the supreme position is not profound patriotism, and it is not sound philosophy.

' The dice of Deity are always loaded ' (ἀεὶ γὰρ εἰ πίπτουσιν οἱ Διὸς κύβοι) said the Greek, and he was right. No mere chance determines the success of true science ; it never throws ambs-ace. Surely knowledge, and culture, and conduct will

¹ *The Education of the American Citizen*, New York, 1902, p. 167.

more and more be established, and more and more generally acknowledged and felt to be established, upon the work of the exact scholar, the specialist, who silences all narrow questioning by the wide-reaching paradox of the poet's query :

How fail
To find, or, better, lose your question, in this quick
Reply which nature yields, ample and catholic ?

The scientific specialist will contribute for conduct a code of honesty, modesty, caution, and tolerance ; on the other hand, the new manner will more and more require that the culture-subjects be brought under the law of accuracy : literature, æsthetics, the arts, criticism, and religion, will more and more become scientific. And thereby the duties and the joys of life will be made deeper and broader, and they will be filled with truer significance ; citizenship, too, will then be no less a profound duty, and it will surely be a profounder joy.

In thus alluding in one way and another to experiences by which we have been brought to our present state of scientific and academic citizenship, our phrases have passed gradually from the department of retrospection to that of prophecy. Much has been accomplished in the brief history of this Association, but that much is the merest symbol of what remains to be done and surely will be done. At no time has the philological future promised such rich rewards as it now holds in its generous hands. In modern philology the recent past has had its enthusiasms, and many of the keen delights and prompt rewards of pioneering ; these experiences, not unaccompanied by hardships and beset by hindrances, have necessarily preceded the fuller life of more complete cultivation. We are upon the eve of that fuller life. Ampler provision for the future of modern philology could hardly have been made in so brief a period. No more inviting conditions for the profound study of problems in the history of the human mind could easily be imagined than those which are now provided and which unite and interlock the different philologies.

National progress, too, requires the profound study of these problems ; for the philological sanity and strength of a nation is the measure of its intellectual and spiritual vitality. Here is high service for state and nation. No statesmanship is higher than that to which the philologist may attain. He legislates for the activities and behavior of mind and spirit ; he must therefore share in the “work of guiding the destinies of the country.”

The “precipices” of philology “show untrodden green ;” the heights will never be overpeopled. “The consummate flower of American education” may not often be found in the library of the philologist ; but let President Hadley be called to testify that the preëminent specialist in Sanskrit, the scientific specialist in grammar, the great and gentle Whitney, conferred a glory,—if not the glory of the “consummate flower,”—upon the dignity and honor of American citizenship.

Finally,—for your patience has been taxed too much,—let this be made an occasion for the renewal of our faith. Alexander J. Ellis¹ observed that the Welsh word for ‘twenty,’ *ugain*, has been curiously Anglicized by the Yorkshire shepherd, who, in counting his sheep, score by score, guided by the etymologizing instinct, has confused the foreign *ugain* with his native *again* ; and, to make it altogether intelligible, he has prefixed *gin*, meaning ‘begin,’ and so for ‘twenty’ has obtained the expression *gin again* (*gin ugeēn* ; *ghin a gaen*). His score thus ends, as he understands it, “with an injunction to *begin again*.” This Association in its counting has arrived at just twenty. Surely it is willing to adopt the simple shepherd’s score-name, *gin again*, in the sense of a solemn injunction laid upon it to enrich its second score wisely by the profitable experiences of its first, and devoutly by a renewed and an increasingly disinterested dedication of its work and influence to the cause of truth.

¹“The Anglo-Cymric Score.” *Transactions of the Philological Society* (London), 1877-8-9, p. 316 f.